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ABSTRACT:American Federal Indian law is often mistakenly assumed to be a
gender-neutral discipline. Although Native women suffer disproportionately
from numerous maladies, Indian law practitioners rarely engage with questions
of gender discrimination or intersectional oppression. Several Canadian
scholars have begun to explicate “indigenous feminist legal theory.” This is the
first Article in the United States to consider how such a theory might inform
the practice of Federal Indian law and tribal law.
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INTRODUCTION
I began writing this Article just six weeks after the historic November 2018
midterm elections. On the evening of November 6, the world of American
politics saw the election of the first-ever Native
1
women to Congress—Deb
Haaland (Laguna Pueblo) of New Mexico and Sharice Davids (Ho-Chunk) of
Kansas.
2
Native women have been subject to the laws of the United States for
hundreds of years with absolutely no voice—indeed, no presence—in the halls
of Congress. That same evening, Peggy Flanagan (White Earth Ojibwe) of
Minnesota became the first Native woman to be elected to serve as lieutenant
governor of a state. Many other Native women won seats in state legislatures
across the country. Native women are also emerging in other types of high
visibility political and legal positions. For example, Tobi Young (Chickasaw)
became the first Native person to clerk for the United States Supreme Court when
Justice Neil Gorsuch appointed her in 2018.
3
We are entering a new era of
political visibility of contemporary Native women.
It is within the context of this moment that I assess the field of Indian law
and tribal law. This Article considers whether the discipline is keeping up with
the times with regard to gender consciousness and lasting equity for Native
women and Native Two-Spirit (LGBTQ+) people.
4
I also situate this Article in
the context of the #MeToo movement, as several Native women have come
forward with their own experiences of sexual abuse and harassment in the Indian
law workplace.
This inquiry is also prompted by the numerous issues of inequity that Native
women continue to experience in 2019. It is becoming common knowledge that
Native women experience extremely high rates of violent crime, including
1. In this Article, I choose to use the word “Native” to mean American Indian and Alaska Native
people in the United States. I use “indigenous” to speak more generally about Native people in other
countries (including Canada).
2. Julian Brave NoiseCat, “They’re Gonna Rock It”: The First Day Native Women Served on
Capitol Hill, THE NATION (Jan. 7, 2019), https://www.thenation.com/article/haaland-davids-congress-
joy-native-representation/ [https://perma.cc/2XWV-6UFR].
3. Tony Mauro, Gorsuch Hires Native American Law Clerk, Likely First in SCOTUS History,
NAT’L L.J. (Apr. 14 2018), https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/2018/04/14/gorsuch-hires-native-
american-law-clerk-likely-first-in-scotus-history/?slreturn=20190117173747 [https://perma.cc/VL5T-
PHXJ].
4. Cherokee scholar Qwo-Li Driskill explains, “The term Two-Spirit was chosen as an intertribal
term to be used in English as a way to communicate numerous tribal traditions and social categories of
gender outside dominant European binaries.” Qwo-Li Driskill, Doubleweaving Two-Spirit Critiques:
Building Alliances between Native and Queer Studies, 16 GLQ: A J. LESBIAN GAY STUD. 69, 72 (2010).
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domestic violence, sexual assault, stalking, and murder.
5
The federal
government’s own statistics reveal that the vast majority—over 80 percent—of
Native people in the United States have experienced violent victimization.
6
In
fact, where there has been progress in Federal Indian law, it has largely turned
on the issue of high rates of domestic violence and sexual assault.
7
The rates of
violence are an extension of the historical mistreatment and dehumanization of
Native women. These practices have continued well into the twenty-first century
in the form of hypersexualized images of Native women, often associated with
“sexy” Indian Halloween costumes and movies like Disney’s Pocahontas.
8
But there are other areas of gender inequity that deserve attention.
9
For
example, Native women experience the highest poverty rate in the United
States.
10
While Native people in general experience high poverty rates in the
United States, Native men are less likely to experience poverty than Native
women.
11
Further, in 2018, the American Association of University Women
released a report concluding that Native women overall only make fifty-eight
percent of a white man’s earnings.
12
Many Native women are unable to access comprehensive reproductive
healthcare, including adequate prenatal care.
13
Other reproductive disparities
experienced by Native women include higher rates of unintended pregnancies
14
5. ANDRE B. ROSAY, VIOLENCE AGAINST AMERICAN INDIAN AND ALASKA NATIVEWOMEN AND
MEN: 2010 FINDINGS FROM THENATIONAL INTIMATE PARTNER AND SEXUALVIOLENCE SURVEY (2016),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/249736.pdf [https://perma.cc/VL5T-PHXJ].
6. Id. at 2 (concluding that 84.3 percent of American Indian and Alaska Native women and 81.6
percent of American Indian and Alaska Native men have experienced violence).
7. See discussion infra Part I.
8. See, e.g., CUTCHA RISLING BALDY, WE ARE DANCING FOR YOU: NATIVE FEMINISMS & THE
REVITALIZATION OF WOMEN’S COMING-OF-AGE CEREMONIES 32 (2018) (“Throughout history, Native
women have been portrayed as either Pocahontas or the squaw. Either Native women are assisting in the
colonization of their people, or they are dirty and disregarded as overtly sexual, stupid, and lazy. Native
women have also been left out of historical scholarship and treated as peripheral to their nations, cultures,
and societies rather than shown as integral or as serving in leadership positions.”).
9. JENNIE R. JOE& FRANCINE C. GACHUPIN, HEALTH AND SOCIAL ISSUES OFNATIVE AMERICAN
WOMEN viii (2012) (noting that “[American Indian and Alaska Native] women face extraordinary
challenges in all spheres of life: economic, health, social, and education.”).




12. AM. ASS’N OF U. WOMEN, THE SIMPLE TRUTH ABOUT THE GENDER PAY GAP (2018),
https://www.aauw.org/resource/the-simple-truth-about-the-gender-pay-gap/ [https://perma.cc/GTP6-
YUZH].
13. Greta B. Raglan et al., Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Preterm Birth Among American Indian
and Alaska Native Women, 20 MATERNAL& CHILD HEALTH J. 16, 19 (2016).
14. URBAN INDIAN HEALTH INSTITUTE, REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH OF URBAN AMERICAN INDIAN
AND ALASKA NATIVE WOMEN: EXAMINING UNINTENDED PREGNANCY, CONTRACEPTION, SEXUAL
HISTORY AND BEHAVIOR, AND NON-VOLUNTARY SEXUAL INTERCOURSE 7 (2010),
https://mchb.hrsa.gov/research/documents/finalreports/forquera_r40_mc_08954_final_report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q4ZE-M5YZ] (concluding that, “Urban AI/AN had higher rates of unintended
pregnancies and higher rates of mistimed pregnancies than NH-whites”).
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and higher rates of pre-term births.
15
As a result, in some states, the Native infant
mortality rates are up to three times greater than that of whites.
16
Native women
also lack adequate access to abortion services, in large part due to the Hyde
Amendment, which prohibits the use of federal funding for abortions except in
the narrow circumstances.
17
Health disparities persist beyond reproductive care. According to the federal
government’s own statistics, Native women are more likely than white women
to suffer from obesity, diabetes, hypertension, liver disease, kidney disease, HIV
and hepatitis.
18
Native women are also far more likely than white women to
suffer from mental health problems, including substance abuse disorders, post-
traumatic stress disorder, and suicidal ideation.
19
The suicide rate for Native
women and girls between 15 and 24 is six times that of all races combined.
20
In this Article, I argue that attorneys and legal scholars should intentionally
think about gender in the context of Federal Indian law and tribal law to assess
whether there are areas for closer consideration and attention. I am primarily
interested in whether we can better address gender inequities in the lives of
Native women, including gendered violence. As part of this analysis, I explore
how attorneys and legal scholars can—and do—support the interests of Native
women in their work.
21
As a self-identified Native feminist who is also an
attorney, I am interested in asking hard questions about the shortcoming of the
Indian Bar to adequately address the needs of Native women and Two-Spirit
people.
How do feminism and Indian law “meet”? What are the cross-sections of
efforts to promote gender equity and the continued resilient existence of tribal
nations? In order to answer these questions, I begin by defining the word
“feminism” itself. There are multiple strands of schools of feminist thought—
some entirely inconsistent with one another. Therefore, more scholars are now
15. See, e.g., Raglan, supra note 13, at 16.
16. See, e.g., Ramona A. Danielson et al., Disparities in Risk Factors and Birth Outcomes Among
American Indians in North Dakota, 22 MATERNAL& CHILD HEALTH J. 1519 (2018).
17. Dep’t of Labor, Health and Hum. Servs., and Educ. and Related Agencies Appropriations Act,
1998, Pub. L. No. 105-78, §§ 509-510, 111 Stat. 1467 (1997) [hereinafter Hyde Amendment].
18. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., WOMEN’S HEALTH USA 2011 (2011),
https://mchb.hrsa.gov/whusa11/hstat/hssp/pages/235aianw.html [https://perma.cc/8M7S-P5VH].
19. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, MENTAL HEALTH DISPARITIES: AMERICAN INDIANS
ANDALASKA 2 (2017).
20. Sally C. Curtin & Holly Hedegaard, Suicide Rates for Females and Males by Race and Ethnicity:
United States, 1999 and 2017, at 2 (2019), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hestat/suicide/rates_1999_
2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/VM4A-T9HR].
21. I mean to cast a wide net in terms of the audience for this Article. The practice of Indian law
takes many forms, including working for non-profit organizations, government organizations (federal,
state, or tribal), or private practice, for-profit lobbying arms and trade organizations. I mean for this Article
to be inclusive of all attorneys who practice Indian law—including non-Native practitioners. I believe as
a collective, we have a responsibility to our profession to be mindful of the ways that gender and sexuality
intersect with our work.
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speaking of plural feminisms rather than a monolithic feminism.
22
For the
purposes of this Article, I consider feminisms to be legal and social responses to
entrenched patriarchy. This simplified definition is, on the one hand, reductive,
but on the other, a useful framework because it is broad enough to encompass
different types and styles of patriarchy, along with different types and styles of
responses. Patriarchy comes in different forms and can be modified to include
terms like “hetero-patriarchy” and “settler colonial patriarchy,” which are both
relevant for Native women.
23
The thrust of most feminist movements is to
overturn sexist andmisogynist laws and practices through legal and social action,
which, again, can take many forms.
More specifically, in this Article, I approach Indian law using the lens of
indigenous feminisms. I intentionally choose to use the fraught “f” word in this
analysis, even though mainstream feminist movements and Native women have
not always had an easy relationship. Indeed, mainstream feminism has
historically failed Native women by ignoring or marginalizing issues like
sovereignty and self-determination. Moreover, despite the fact that many early
white American feminists were influenced by Native women,
24
early American
feminists were sometimes the instigators and supporters of horrific Federal
Indian law policies, including the boarding school era and child removal.
25
Thus,
it makes sense that many indigenous women categorically reject the label of
“feminist” because of its Western, colonial connotations, even while supporting
Native women’s rights.
26
Some Native women who reject the term “feminism”
point out that patriarchy is a foreign concept to traditional tribal cultures.
27
If
feminism is a response to patriarchy, Native women have perhaps not needed it.
22. See, e.g., Gina Miranda Samuels & Fariyal Ross-Sheriff, Identity, Oppression, and Power:
Feminisms and Intersectionality Theory, 23 AFFIL. J. WOMEN SOC. WORK 5, 6 (2008) (noting that “[u]se
of the term feminisms in the plural to represent this diversity is an acknowledgment of these [scholarly]
efforts.”).
23. Settler colonialism is “a unique brand of colonialism in which colonizers took up permanent
and intimate residence among the Native people they exploited and resources they extracted rather than
occupying temporary posts.” KATRINA JAGODINSKY, LEGAL CODES AND TALKING TREES: INDIGENOUS
WOMEN’S SOVEREIGNTY IN THE SONORAN AND PUGET SOUND BORDERLANDS, 1854-1946, at 4 (2016).
24. See Sally Roesch Wagner, The Indigenous Roots of United States Feminism, in FEMINIST
POLITICS, ACTIVISM AND VISION: LOCAL AND GLOBAL CHALLENGES 267–284 (Luciana Ricciutelli,
Angela Miles, & Margaret H. McFadden eds., 2004) (describing how early suffrage activists like Matilda
Joclyn Gage were influenced by observations of women of the Iroquois (Haudenosaunee) confederacy).
25. See generally MARGARET D. JACOBS, WHITE MOTHER TO A DARK RACE: SETTLER
COLONIALISM, MATERNALISM, AND THE REMOVAL OF INDIGENOUS CHILDREN IN THE AMERICANWEST
ANDAUSTRALIA, 1880-1940 (2009);MARGARETD. JACOBS, ENGENDEREDENCOUNTERS: FEMINISMAND
PUEBLO CULTURES, 1879-1934 (1999).
26. See, e.g., Haunani-Kay Trask, Feminism and Indigenous Hawaiian Nationalism, 21 SIGNS 906,
909 (1996) (“I recognized that a practicing feminism hampered organizing among my people in rural
communities. Given our nationalist context, feminism appeared as just another haole intrusion into a
besieged Hawaiian world. Any exclusive focus on women neglected the historical oppression of all
Hawaiians and the large force field of imperialism.”).
27. See, e.g., Laura Tohe, There Is No Word for Feminism in My Language, 15 WICAZO SA REV.
103, 104 (2000) (exploring the power of female lineage in Diné culture and noting the fact that the Diné
language does not have a word for “feminism”).
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Still, I am intentionally choosing to use the term “feminisms” because it
carries profound implications for structural change that I see as a critical
intervention in the lives of twenty-first century Native women. Though
patriarchy may have been a European import, it now exists in the lives of Native
people through forced assimilation and cultural hegemony.
But it wasn’t until the late twentieth century that Native women started
writing about contemporary feminism in any sustained fashion. Paula Gunn
Allen’s 1982 book The Sacred Hoop opened up multiple conversations among
academic and activist circles about whether certain feminist principles are
inherent within tribal cultures.
28
More self-identified indigenous feminists have
joined the academy in the past two decades, developing a corpus of writings,
including multiple anthologies focused on the way that indigenous feminists
analyze political, legal, and social problems.
29
Native feminists often deploy and explore the concept of “intersectionality,”
a term coined by Black legal scholar Kimberlé Crenshaw in 1989.
30
Intersectional feminist theory understands that gender oppression is inextricably
linked to other forms of oppression, such as race and class. In other words,
experiences of gendered oppression may be substantively different depending on
one’s position in society. By conceptualizing Native gender oppression as
inextricably linked to settler colonialism and Western imperialism, Native
feminists have begun to explicate the unique ways in which Native women
experience patriarchy, including the problem of sexism perpetrated by Native
men.
However, as Emily Snyder notes, there has been little, if any, sustained focus
on how indigenous feminism can inform legal theory and practice.
31
As a result
of this gap, in 2014 Snyder published what may be the first North American law
journal article to begin articulating contemporary indigenous feminist legal
theory. In “Indigenous Feminist Legal Theory,” published in the Canadian
Journal of Women and the Law, Snyder identifies an underdeveloped
intersection of three theoretical fields: feminist legal theory, Indigenous feminist
theory, and Indigenous legal theory.
32
By exploring this intersection, she
ultimately concludes that Indigenous feminist legal theory (IFLT) is “an
28. PAULA GUNN ALLEN, THE SACRED HOOP: RECOVERING THE FEMININE IN AMERICAN INDIAN
TRADITIONS (1982).
29. See, e.g., CRITICALLY SOVEREIGN: INDIGENOUSGENDER, SEXUALITY,AND FEMINIST STUDIES
(Joanne Barker ed., 2017); INDIGENOUSWOMEN AND FEMINISM: POLITICS, ACTIVISM, CULTURE (Cheryl
Suzack et al. eds., 2010); MAKING SPACE FOR INDIGENOUS FEMINISM (Joyce Green ed., 2007).
30. Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist
Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory, and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
139, 140 (1989).
31. Emily Snyder, Indigenous Feminist Legal Theory, 26 CAN. J. WOMEN& L. 365, 366 (2014)
(“[T]here are few scholars accounting for . . . gendered realities in relation to Indigenous laws, and . . .
the insights and contributions from their research have yet to be widely embraced.”).
32. Id. at 367.
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important analytic tool that is intersectional, attentive to power, anti-colonial,
anti-essentialist, multi-juridical, and embraces a spirit of critique that challenges
static notions of tradition, identity, gender, sex and sexuality.”
33
Whereas
mainstream American feminist legal theory has existed for decades,
34
IFLT is a
relatively new theory, largely explicated by Canadian scholars of indigenous
law, including Snyder, Val Napoleon, and John Borrows.
35
In this Article, I apply
IFLT to American Federal Indian law and tribal law as a way to explore how and
why Native women experience law and oppression in the United States.
To do so, I explore the substance and practice of Indian law through an IFLT
lens. Because IFLT uses an intersectional framework, it offers a way to
synthesize how and why Native women suffer multiple different kinds of
oppression simultaneously. Native women in the United States experience
structural discrimination in the forms of at least four ideologies: sexism, settler
colonialism, classism, and racism. Two-Spirit Native people also suffer from
insidious forms of homophobia and transphobia. IFLT allows us to see these
intersections and begin to think of practical, creative solutions to intersecting
oppressions. IFLT also allows us to view tribal sovereignty and gender equity as
closely linked. Native women’s liberation is a key component of lasting change
in Indian country.
36
I take to heart Snyder’s explication of IFLT as “a spirit of
critique that challenges static notions of tradition, identity, gender, sex and
sexuality” and offer these critiques in the spirit of improving the lives of Native
women and Two-Spirit people. Because IFLT is in its nascent stages of
development, I hope that this Article will continue a necessary conversation
about the efficacy of feminism in the context of Indian law.
The Article proceeds in three parts. In Part I, I explore how gender
oppression is expressed in the context of Federal Indian law, often assumed to
be a gender-neutral legal discipline. The only significant “gender” case in
Federal Indian law is Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez.
37
In fact, the very few
articles written by feminists about Indian law are almost invariably written about
the famous 1978 patrilineal descent case.
38
However, there are gendered
33. Snyder, supra note 31, at 401.
34. See, e.g., MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 17 (3d ed.
2013) (discussing the emergence of feminist legal theory in the United States during the 1970s).
35. See, e.g., Emily Snyder, et. al.,Gender and Violence: Drawing on Indigenous Legal Resources,
48 U.B.C. L. REV. 593 (2015).
36. Indian country is defined at 18 U.S.C. § 1151 as “(a) all land within the limits of any Indian
reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any
patent, and, including rights-of-way running through the reservation, (b) all dependent Indian
communities within the borders of the United States whether within the original or subsequently acquired
territory thereof, and whether within or without the limits of a state, and (c) all Indian allotments, the
Indian titles to which have not been extinguished, including rights-of-way running through the same.”
37. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
38. See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Whose Culture? A Case Note on Martinez v. Santa
Clara Pueblo, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 63 (1987); Francine R.
Skenandore, Revisiting Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez: Feminist Perspectives on Tribal Sovereignty, 17
WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 347 (2002).
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implications in a variety of other contexts in Federal Indian law and policy. I will
explore some of those implications and proffer possibilities for sustaining a
gender-conscious response. I also consider ways to increase the visibility and
profile of Native women in the federal courts by crafting gender-conscious
arguments.
In Part II, I consider how gender intersects with tribal legal systems. I am
interested in ensuring that Native women are visible within tribal court systems,
with the understanding that each tribal nation must approach gendered problems
within the context of its own culture and history. In this Part, I also explore the
possible remedies that can emerge from the development and reform of tribal
statutes and policies. As I often say to my students, there is no reason that tribal
codes in the United States cannot have the strongest protections for women, far
exceeding those found in state and federal laws. Unfortunately, due to centuries
of assimilation, many tribal justice systems adopted American legal “norms,”
such as sexism. Some tribal legal systems, though, have managed to maintain
some connection to pre-colonial gender equity principles. For this Part, I
gathered several published tribal appellate court opinions that consider a
question about tribal law and gender. I use these as examples for how tribal
attorneys and judges have recognized gendered claims that are grounded in
traditional tenets or principles. I also offer some examples of ways in which tribal
courts have reinforced patriarchy.
My Article closes with Part III, which is a reflection on the experiences of
Native women law students, professors, attorneys and legal scholars. This Part
contributes to an ongoing dialogue about sexism faced by Native women
attorneys and scholars. I believe the Indian Bar can do a great deal to ensure that
Native women and Two-Spirit (LGBTQ+) attorneys in the workplace receive
pay equity and respect from co-workers. I ultimately conclude that a gender-
conscious Indian law paradigm serves common goals of tribal sovereignty and
self-determination.
I. FEDERAL INDIAN LAW
In this Part, I offer some thoughts on how IFLT can inform the thinking and
practice of Federal Indian law.
39
Although issues of gender and sexuality arise
every day in the lives of tribal people, much of Federal Indian law, both historical
and contemporary, has usually proceeded as if it were gender-neutral, even
though problematic results were often heavily gendered. Early Federal Indian
law was established and cultivated by a patriarchal government that was
39. By Federal Indian law, I mean to include both federal case law as well as statutory and
regulatory codes.
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preceded by colonial systems that emanated from patriarchal countries.
40
American law was based on the common law tradition of England, which largely
treated women as property or chattel of their husbands.
41
Thus, at the founding
of the United States, American women had little, if any, legal or political
power.
42
And it was within this historic patriarchal paradigm that Federal Indian
law was developed and fostered. In fact, it was not until the twentieth century
that any real progress was made toward government and cultural reform for any
women in the United States.
Patriarchy influenced the development of Federal Indian law in a variety of
ways beyond the scope of this Article.
43
For example, some of the earliest formal
legal relations between tribal nations and the federal government were marked
with a significant absence and erasure of Native women’s political power. One
of the challenges faced by early Indian leaders was that European governments
almost invariably declined to treat or even negotiate with Native women.
44
Thus,
Native women’s perspectives rarely found their way into treaty language.
45
Moreover, this tendency to treat only with Native men became part of the
hegemonic introduction of patriarchy. As Native men were treated as more
powerful in the eyes of Europeans, some internalized the Western concept of
natural superiority of men and began to deny Native women their rightful role as
equal participants in social and political spheres.
46
To the extent that federal
officials encouraged or mandated that tribal nations adopt Christianity, this also
introduced patriarchal logics that conceptualize men as heads of the household
and women as subservient to men.
Formal government assimilation and forced “civilization” policies, which
reached their height in the late nineteenth to mid-twentieth centuries, were also
grounded in patriarchal logics.
47
For almost a century, the government forced
40. See generally OLWEN HUFTON, THE PROSPECT BEFORE HER: A HISTORY OF WOMEN IN
WESTERN EUROPE, 1500-1800 (1995) (exploring how few legal rights European women had).
41. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND CH. 15 (Of Husband
and Wife).
42. JOAN HOFF, LAW, GENDER, AND INJUSTICE: A LEGAL HISTORY OF U.S. WOMEN 4 (1991)
(“[T]he Founding Fathers believed in the necessity of limiting legal equality primarily to white, male
property owners.”).
43. I highly recommend the work of Bethany Berger who has painstakingly chronicled the variety
of different gendered issues that were embedded in historic Indian law. See Bethany R. Berger, After
Pocahontas: Indian Women and the Law, 1830 to 1934, 21 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1 (1997); Bethany R.
Berger, Indian Policy and the Imagined Indian Woman, 14 KANSAS J. L. PUB. POL’Y 103 (2004).
44. Bethany R. Berger, Indian Policy and the Imagined Indian Woman, 14 KANSAS J. L. PUB.
POL’Y 103, 105-106 (2004); see also BALDY, supra note 8, at 33 (noting that “When Westerners came to
negotiate, however, they did not invite or involve women . . . .”).
45. See, e.g., Shirley R Bysiewicz & Ruth E. Van de Mark, The Legal Status of the Dakota Indian
Woman, 3 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 255, 266 (1975) (“The truly democratic nature of Dakota society was
never comprehended, and the role of Dakota women in that process was completely ignored.”).
46. See Joyce Green, Taking Account of Aboriginal Feminism, inMAKINGSPACE FOR INDIGENOUS
FEMINISM 20–32, 22-23 (Joyce Green ed., 2007).
47. See, e.g., Andrea A. Curcio, Civil Claims for Uncivilized Acts: Filing Suit Against the
Government for American Indian Boarding School Abuses, 4 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 45, 49
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thousands of Native children to attend government or church-run boarding
schools to formally indoctrinate them into “white” Christian culture.
48
Patriarchal control and gender hierarchy were institutionalized in these schools.
49
Native boys were taught to farm and weld, whereas Native girls were trained as
domestic servants, developing skills in sewing and baking.
50
Native
anthropologist K. Tsianina Lomawaima explains, “the underlying federal agenda
. . . was to train Indian girls in subservience and submission to authority.”
51
In
addition to enforcing Western gender roles, these boarding schools almost
universally utilized corporal punishment as the primary means of discipline, and
school officials inflicted horrific abuse upon many Native children.
52
Given the
high rates of physical and sexual abuse that occurred during the boarding school
era, we might even consider thatWestern gender hierarchies were literally beaten
into the children.
53
Even though gendered hegemony has been central to the colonial project,
gendered consciousness is largely absent from Federal Indian law today. Berger
notes that the words “women,” “wives,” and “mothers” were not even indexed
in Felix Cohen’s famous treatise on Federal Indian Law.
54
In fact, one of the only
clear connections between Native women and Federal Indian law comes from
(2006) (“To Europeans, ownership of land and other property, Christianity, a nuclear family in which the
man made all the decisions and children were strictly and harshly disciplined and were taught the value
of hard work so that they could acquire more land and material goods, were life’s guiding principles.
These principles shaped the devastation wrought by European settlers on America’s indigenous people.”).
48. See, e.g., id. at 46; Ann Murray Haag, The Indian Boarding School Era and Its Continuing
Impact on Tribal Families and the Provision of Government Services, 43 TULSA L. REV. 149, 153 (2007);
Linda J Lacey, The White Man’s Law and the American Indian Family in the Assimilation Era, 40 ARK.
L. REV. 327, 357-359 (1986); Teresa Evans-Campbell et al., Indian Boarding School Experience,
Substance Use, and Mental Health among Urban Two-Spirit American Indian/Alaska Natives, 38 AM. J.
DRUGALCOHOLABUSE 421, 422 (2012).
49. See Eric Margolis, Looking at Discipline, Looking at Labor: Photographic Representations of
Indian Boarding Schools, 19 VIS. STUD. 54, 55 (2004) (explaining that the long-term goal of boarding
schools was “to exterminate the indigenous culture and replace it with the disciplines, habits, language,
religion and practices of the dominant one.”).
50. Id. at 65 (“[J]ob training was heavily gendered. Boys were trained for farming or industrial
occupations . . . girls for domestic service.”).
51. K. Tsianina Lomawaima, Domesticity in the Federal Indian Schools: The Power of Authority
Over Mind and Body, 20 AM. ETHNOLOGIST 227, 229 (1993).
52. See Robert A. Trennert, Corporal Punishment and the Politics of Indian Reform, 29 HIST.
EDUC. Q. 595, 595 (1989) (explaining that “corporal punishment was seen as a useful tool in promoting
the discipline necessary for assimilation…the infliction of pain by means of spanking, whipping, and even
beating was justified.”).
53. At a Phoenix boarding school, for example, “matrons regularly used male employees to whip
unruly Indian girls.” Id. at 600.
54. Berger, After Pocahontas, supra note 43, at 2-3. Even today, the only references to gender in
the current iteration of Cohen’s handbook come from twenty-first century efforts to draw attention to the
high rate of victimization experienced by Native women, such as the Violence Against Women Act
(VAWA). A word search for “women” in the current 2017 version of the Handbook yields several results,
almost all connected to VAWA. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (Nell Jessup Newton
ed., 2017).
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the seminal 1978 case Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez.
55
Many consider this case
to be one of the most significant Indian law cases of the last century.
56
In Santa Clara, Julia Martinez brought a federal lawsuit alleging gender
discrimination by her tribe, the Santa Clara Pueblo.
57
At that time, the Pueblo
had a strict patrilineal citizenship law. Because Ms. Martinez married a Navajo
man, her children were not eligible for enrollment in the Pueblo, leading to
numerous hardships for her family.
58
The case was appealed to the Supreme
Court, and the Court was able to sidestep the question of gender discrimination
by holding that the Pueblo (like all tribal governments) was immune from such
suits.
59
Therefore, the substantive question of gender discrimination is left to the
tribal nations. As Tweedy argues, the 1978 decision “led to a widespread,
monolithic impression that tribes were not protective of the rights of women.”
60
While the case is largely lauded a “victory” for tribal nations,
61
some observers
have raised concern that the decision is now being used by tribal nations to shield
discriminatory laws from oversight.
62
Odawa legal scholar Wenona T. Singel
writes, “Many have criticized the harm inflicted on individuals by tribes and have
questioned whether tribal sovereignty’s legal affirmation was achieved on the
backs of women and other oppressed individuals within tribal communities.”
63
This framework requires a feminist analysis—indeed, a Native feminist analysis
to unpack.
Indigenous feminist legal theory, though, takes us far beyond the contours
of Santa Clara and patrilineal descent laws, and illuminates the discovery of
other gendered issues facing our communities that often are eclipsed in gender-
neutral conversations about tribal resiliency and tribal sovereignty. IFLT
encourages us to think critically about how Federal Indian law has developed
with regard to gender, something that has not been done in mainstream feminist
legal theory. Bringing an indigenous lens to mainstream feminist jurisprudence
is necessary; merely being feminist in and of itself does not necessarily mean
that one understands the historical legacy and nuances of colonization and
contemporary Indian law. Many of my feminist friends, for example, are
55. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
56. JOANNE BARKER, NATIVE ACTS: LAW, RECOGNITION, AND CULTURAL AUTHENTICITY 100
(2011) (“The literature that has addressed the importance of the Martinez decision is exhaustive.”).
57. Santa Clara, 436 U.S. at 51.
58. Id. at 52.
59. Id. at 59 (“[W]e conclude that suits against the tribe under ICRA are barred by its sovereign
immunity from suit.”).
60. Ann E. Tweedy, Sex Discrimination Under Tribal Law, 36 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 392, 394
(2010).
61. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Supreme Court's Indian Problem, 59 HASTINGSL.J. 579, 614 (2008)
(the case is one of the “major wins for tribal interests.”).
62. Wenona T. Singel, Indian Tribes and Human Rights Accountability, 49 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
567, 585 (2012) (“[F]ederal judges have openly expressed concern that tribal immunity from federal court
review leaves tribes free to engage in acts that are deeply troubling on the level of fundamental substantive
justice.”).
63. Id. at 586.
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surprised to hear that Ruth Bader Ginsburg has ruled against tribal interests in
several monumental cases.
64
While mainstream feminist theories center a
universal “woman” in legal analysis, indigenous feminist theories center a
“Native” woman as the focal point for analysis. In the following section, I
explain how centering Native women leads to different types of practice
strategies and interventions.
A. Feminist Interventions in Federal Indian Law
Because Federal Indian law on its surface often appears to be gender-neutral,
we must be creative in thinking about how to bring gender back into Federal
Indian law conversations. Here, I consider how IFLT can inform the praxis and
practice of Indian law. For the past five years, I have worked with Cherokee
attorney and playwright Mary Kathryn Nagle
65
to file gender-conscious amicus
briefs in major Supreme Court Indian law cases. We initially conceived of this
project as an intervention for the 2016 case Dollar General v. Mississippi
Choctaw
66
(described infra at Section I.A.1) but have filed similar briefs in three
other cases. This is a concerted effort to re-introduce gender as a necessary
element of consideration in Indian law cases.
67
We saw the need to consider the
impact of Federal Indian law on the lives of Native women and their children in
ways that conventional jurisprudence could miss. By providing a gendered
intervention, we believe that federal courts can grasp a larger picture of what is
at stake than is otherwise possible with a gender-neutral approach. In other
words, by arguing on behalf of women we enlarge the lens through which judges
can view the case.
68
We are hopeful that these gender-conscious briefs are of
interest to at least some of the Justices and may be able to influence votes on key
questions of sovereignty and self-determination.
The primary client for these amicus briefs has been the National Indigenous
Women’s Resource Center (NIWRC), a national non-profit organization
dedicated to addressing domestic violence and sexual assault in tribal
communities.
69
Over 100 local and regional anti-violence coalitions (including
64. See Carole Goldberg, Finding the Way to Indian Country: Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s
Decisions in Indian Law Cases, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 1003,1004 (2009) (noting that “several of her opinions
have garnered considerable (and justified) criticism from Indian law scholars and tribal leaders . . . .”).
65. Ms. Nagle serves as counsel of record in these briefs.
66. 136 S. Ct. 2159 (2016).
67. A similar brief had been filed by other attorneys in Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family
Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316 (2007).
68. FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: REWRITTEN OPINIONS OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 5
(Kathryn M. Stanchi, Linda L. Berger & Bridget J. Crawford eds., 2016) (“Feminist consciousness
broadens and widens the lens through which we view law and helps the decision maker overcome the
natural tendency to see things the same way or do things ‘the way they’ve always been done.’”).
69. Organizational History, NAT’L INDIGENOUS WOMEN’S RESOURCE CTR., http://www.ni
wrc.org/content/organizational-history [http://perma.cc/Z5NM-YMMG] (“[NIWRC is] dedicated to
reclaiming the sovereignty of Native nations and safeguarding Native women and their children.”).
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non-Native organizations) have also signed on to these briefs.
70
The following
Section summarizes the three briefs we have filed, along with an assessment of
their efficacy.
1. Dollar General v. Mississippi Choctaw
In Dollar General v. Mississippi Choctaw,
71
the Court considered whether
non-Indian businesses could be subject to tribal civil jurisdiction. At its core,
however, the case was about a young child who had been sexually victimized by
a non-Indian,
72
a story that ultimately was eclipsed by the dry, mechanical
question of civil adjudicatory authority.
Many Native women’s organizations were quite concerned about the stakes
in Dollar General because the case concerned sexual abuse.
73
The facts reveal
an all-too-common theme in Indian country: a non-Indian commits acts of sexual
violence and escapes tribal criminal jurisdiction. Since the 1978 Supreme Court
decision in Oliphant v. Suquamish,
74
tribal justice systems had been prohibited
from prosecuting non-Indians—for any crime, no matter how heinous or
insidious. According to the National Institute of Justice, most Native victims
report that they have had a least one perpetrator who is non-Native.
75
The facts
in Dollar General date back to 2003, when the white manager of a reservation-
based Dollar General retail establishment molested a 13-year-old Choctaw boy
who had been temporarily placed with the store though a Youth Opportunity
Program.
76
Even though the victim reported the abuse—a rarity in itself—the
tribal government had no power to prosecute the perpetrator since he was non-
Indian. The question of whether the company could be vicariously liable for the
harm, though, raised different legal questions, since Oliphant did not directly
address civil jurisdiction.
Seeking justice, the child’s parents filed a civil lawsuit in Mississippi
Choctaw tribal court against the perpetrator’s employer, the Dollar General
Corporation, which immediately objected to tribal court jurisdiction based on the
same principles elucidated in Oliphant.
77
Even though Dollar General had a
70. The Dollar General amicus brief included 104 additional organizations beyond NIWRC. Brief
of Amici Curiae National Indigenous Women’s Resource Center and Additional Advocacy Organizations
for Survivors of Domestic Violence and Assault in Support of Respondents at 1, Dollar General Corp. v.
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, 136 S. Ct. 2159 (2016) (No. 13-1496) [hereinafter NIWRC Brief,
Dollar General v. Mississippi Choctaw].
71. 136 S. Ct. 2159 (2016).
72. Doglencorp, Inc. v. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, 746 F.3d 167, 169 (5th Cir. 2014).
73. Andrew Bard Epstein, Dollar General Takes Its Case Against Indigenous Sovereignty to the
Supreme Court, THE NATION, (Dec. 7, 2015) https://www.thenation.com/article/dollar-general-takes-its-
case-against-indigenous-sovereignty-to-the-supreme-court/ [https://perma.cc/8Q3B-NPXQ].
74. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
75. ROSAY, supra note 5, at 18-19.
76. Dolgencorp, Inc. v. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, 746 F.3d 167, 169 (5th Cir. 2014).
77. Id. at 169-70.
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contractual relationship with the Choctaw tribe and even though they operated a
retail store on the reservation, they argued that the tribal court had no jurisdiction
over them in this kind of civil tort case.
78
Dollar General appealed the case to the
tribal supreme court, then into federal district court and the Fifth Circuit, and lost
their argument at every juncture (although the case against the manager himself
was dismissed). When the case was granted certiorari by the Supreme Court,
NIWRC expressed interest in filing a brief on behalf of Indian country victims.
As we began strategizing about the purpose of the amicus brief, it became
clear that our primary goal was to encourage the Justices to consider the long-
term ramifications of their decision on victims of abuse. We decided to focus on
gender-conscious public policy arguments since the merits briefs were,
necessarily, heavily focused on Supreme Court precedents and canons of Indian
law. There simply wouldn’t be enough space in the merits briefs to include the
policy arguments we wanted the Court to consider.
Thus, we took the opportunity to argue that a finding against the tribe would
lead to the re-victimization of victims of violent crimes on Indian land, since
they would not be able to seek justice in tribal court for the violent and abusive
actions of non-Indians.
79
Using statistical data and congressional findings, the
brief established that Native women and children are at extremely high risk for
violence. This in turn led us to argue that there are limited remedies for this
violence, and that the ability to sue a non-Native for violence was crucial to the
well-being of Native people.
80
We also raised what we believed was a novel argument about the
“consensual relations” test established in Montana v. United States (1981).
81
Under this Montana test, “a tribe may regulate, through taxation, licensing, or
other means, the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships
with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or
other arrangements.”
82
Dollar General argued that this test should not allow suits
against nonmembers for common law tort actions, because it does not fit under
the categories of taxation or licensing and that nonmembers must offer “clear
and unequivocal consent” to adjudicatory jurisdiction.
83
The Choctaw tribe
countered that the test includes the phrase “or other means” which should be read
to include adjudicative authority over matters that arise as part of the consensual
relationship.
84
In the NIWRC brief, we considered Dollar General’s arguments
in light of sexual abuse, arguing that Dollar General’s position
78. Id.
79. NIWRC Brief, Dollar General v. Mississippi Choctaw, supra note 70.
80. Id. at 4.
81. Id. at 5-7.
82. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981).
83. Brief for the Petitioners at 18, Dollar General v. Mississippi Choctaw, 136 S. Ct. 2159 (2016)
(No. 13-1496).
84. Brief for Respondents at 16, Dollar General v. Mississippi Choctaw, 136 S. Ct. 2159 (2016)
(No. 13-1496).
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would create an untenable situation where tribal courts would have to
inquire as to whether a non-Indian perpetrator clearly and unequivocally
expressed his consent to tribal jurisdiction before he sexually assaulted
or abused a Native woman or child. Not only is the scenario implausible,
it is unconscionable. Native women and children do not consent to being
assaulted on tribal lands, yet this proffered revision of Montana’s
consensual relationships would render their profound lack of consent a
legal nullity.
85
We urged the Court to find in favor of the Mississippi Choctaw Nation so
that other victims would be able to hold offenders accountable in tribal civil
courts. While the brief itself did not use the term “feminist,” the brief was
informed by IFLT, since it considered the twin oppressions of sexism and settler
colonialism in its reasoning. Many Native women from around the country came
to the Supreme Court the day of the oral argument and staged a prayerful
demonstration to further amplify the importance of the case, which significantly
raised the profile of the case for tribal leaders.
86
The oral argument itself focused
largely on Federal Indian law precedent, but there were two references to
concerns about victims. After Dollar General admitted that they would have to
acquiesce to tribal civil jurisdiction regarding business or commercial matters,
Justice Kagan asked, “[i]t’s a bit of an odd argument, isn’t it, Mr. Goldstein, that
there’s less of a sovereign interest in protecting your own citizens than in
enforcing your licensing laws?”
87
Later, during the Choctaw arguments, counsel
Neal Katyal referenced the NIWRCbrief, stating, “[t]he Domestic Violence brief
gives other reasons why in general people want to bring suits in tribal courts
because it’s a more familiar process and one closer, geographically, to them.”
88
Six months later, we learned that the Court had deadlocked at a vote of 4-4
and no opinion was rendered, essentially upholding the Fifth Circuit’s favorable
decision for the tribal government but establishing no nationwide precedent.
89
It
was the longest pending case of the 2015 term. The tie-vote can be fairly
characterized as “victory” or, perhaps more accurately, a “close call,” since it
was clear that four justices were willing to strip tribal nations of civil jurisdiction
85. NIWRC Brief, Dollar General v. Mississippi Choctaw, supra note 70, at 6.
86. Rebecca Nagle, Native Women Protest Sexual Violence Case at the Supreme Court, BITCH
MEDIA (Dec. 4, 2015), https://www.bitchmedia.org/article/native-women-take-fight-against-sexual-
violence-supreme-court [https://perma.cc/73PB-R2GB].
87. Transcript of Oral Argument at 23, Dollar General v. Mississippi Choctaw, 136 S. Ct. 2159
(2016) (No. 13-1496).
88. Id.
89. Justice Scalia had passed away during the Court’s term, on February 13, 2016, and left the
Court with eight justices for a period of time.
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over non-Indians.
90
Unfortunately, the absence of a written opinion in this case
means that we do not know if the NIWRC brief held any weight or importance
for the Court. The next case, however, offered reasons to be more optimistic.
2. United States v. Bryant
In the same term as Dollar General, we also filed a brief in United States v.
Bryant.
91
This case tested the constitutionality of the federal habitual offender
statute, which allows for federal criminal justice authority over people who have
two or more convictions in tribal court.
92
Bryant, the Native defendant, was a
serial domestic violence offender with multiple tribal court convictions for
increasingly disturbing violent behavior against women. Importantly, the
maximum imprisonment sentence that tribal nations were able to impose at that
time was one year, pursuant to the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 (ICRA).
93
The habitual offender statute was passed as part of the Violence Against Women
Act (VAWA)
94
in 2005, and was intended to address the problem of short tribal
jail sentences for abusers by providing for federal criminal jurisdiction after two
predicate cases.
95
Once charged in federal court under the habitual offender
statute, Bryant argued that his tribal court convictions were uncounseled and thus
should not have been considered as a trigger for federal prosecution.
96
Even
though he had court-appointed counsel in federal court, he argued that the
habitual offender statute itself was unconstitutional because it relied on
uncounseled tribal court convictions.
Given that the case turned on a fact pattern involving a dangerous serial
abuser, NIWRC again filed a brief on behalf of Native victims.
97
Since the merits
briefs needed to focus squarely on Sixth Amendment arguments, the NIWRC
brief could enlarge the scope of consideration to include victims of crime.
98
Nagle and I crafted the brief using some of the same statistics we had cited in the
Dollar General brief, again proffering that Native women were at heightened
risk for abuse and were in need of special consideration.
99
We argued that the
federal habitual offender statute was one of the only ways that serial abusers on
90. Sarah Deer & Mary Kathryn Nagle, Return to Worcester: Dollar General and the Restoration
of Tribal Jurisdiction to Protect Women and Children, 41 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 179 (2018) (offering an
optimistic assessment of the tie vote).
91. 136 S. Ct. 1954 (2016).
92. 18 U.S.C. § 117(a).
93. Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1302.
94. Pub. L. 109-162, tit. IX, § 909 (2006).
95. 18 U.S.C. § 117(a).
96. 136 S. Ct. at 1952.
97. Brief of Amici Curiae National Indigenous Women’s Resource Center and Additional
Advocacy Organizations for Survivors of Domestic Violence and Assault in Support of Petitioner, United
States v. Bryant, 136 S. Ct. 1954 (2016) (No. 15-420).
98. Id. The entire brief was framed around the central theme of victim safety.
99. Id. at 13-14.
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reservations could be held accountable. Since tribal courts are limited to a
maximum penalty of three years per offense (only one year at the time of
Bryant’s offenses), abusers such as Bryant were in and out of tribal jail on a
regular basis. Thus, the only way to remove him from the community for the
long term would be for the federal government to prosecute him pursuant to the
habitual offender statute. Ideally, of course, tribal nations would not be limited
in their ability to impose an appropriate carceral sentence on a violent offender,
but until that limitation is eliminated, this kind of federal prosecution may mean
the difference between life and death of Native women on tribal lands. We also
advanced tribal sovereignty arguments by linking the safety and well-being of
Native women to the strength and prosperity of tribal nations.
100
Because Bryant concerned a law that was passed as part of the Violence
Against Women Act, it is somewhat surprising that violence against Native
women was only mentioned near the end of the oral arguments, when counsel
for the United States remarked that Bryant “kept battering women in Indian
country and contributed to that epidemic of domestic violence.”
101
The bulk of
the oral arguments focused on the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, the Indian
Civil Rights Act, and the relevant Supreme Court precedent on those
questions.
102
However, unlike Dollar General, which lingered in the Court for over six
months, the Court issued its opinion in Bryant in less than two months. Bryant
was a unanimous decision (8-0) in favor of upholding the federal statute, with
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg authoring the majority opinion.
103
In this case, it is
clear that the NIWRC brief was, at the very least, consulted in the construction
of the decision.
104
Not only did Ginsburg mention some of the statistics included
in the NIWRC brief, but there are also several parallels between the structure of
the NIWRC brief and the Ginsburg opinion.
105
This opinion suggested to us that
Justice Ginsburg had found the brief informative and relevant.
106
100. Id. at 24.
101. Transcript of Oral Argument at 42, United States v. Bryant, 136 S. Ct. 1954 (2016) (No. 15-
420).
102. Id.
103. United States v. Bryant, 136 S. Ct. 1954 (2016). Justice Thomas authored a concurring
opinion. 136 S. Ct. at 1967.
104. Bethany R. Berger,Hope for Indian Tribes in the U.S. Supreme Court?: Menominee, Nebraska
v. Parker, Bryant, Dollar General…And Beyond, 2017 ILL. L. REV. 1901, 1930 (2017).
105. Ginsburg quoted two statements of Senator John McCain that we had also used in the brief.
Bryant, 136 S. Ct. at 1959, 1961.Moreover, she referenced some of the same precedent we cited, including
Crow Dog and the Indian Civil Rights Act as well as statistical data we used in the brief. Id. at 1961. She
also cited to work published by Sarah Deer. Id. at 1960.
106. Not all Native feminists or tribal sovereignty advocates are in favor of the outcome in Bryant.
The over-incarceration of Native people is a serious problem, and to the extent that Bryant is about
increased federal punitive control over Native people, there is not consensus on the question of the habitual
offender statute. Tribal and federal public defenders have raised concerns about the ramifications of the
Bryant decision for the right to counsel in tribal court. See, e.g., Barbara L. Creel & John P. LaVelle, High
Court Denies Rights of Natives, ALBUQUERQUE J. (June 26, 2016), https://www.abqjournal.com/798285/
high-court-denies-rights-of-natives.html [https://perma.cc/6S2W-LZYM].
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3. Carpenter v. Murphy
Hopeful that the Court was receptive to gender-conscious arguments,
NIWRC filed a third amicus brief in late 2018 in Carpenter v. Murphy,
107
a case
argued in November 2018 but not decided in the 2018-2019 term. The Court has
ordered that re-arguments take place in the next term, and the case remains
undecided as of the publication of this Article. Because the case centers on the
jurisdiction over a grisly homicide, it may seem curious that we filed a brief
siding with the arguments of the defendant. From the outside, Murphy asks a
seemingly gender-neutral question of whether or not there is still a Creek
reservation in Oklahoma. But because of the implications for the safety of Native
women, NIWRC again participated as an amicus.
108
The case began in 1999, when Patrick Dwayne Murphy, a citizen of the
Muscogee (Creek) Nation (MCN), murdered George Jacobs, another citizen of
the MCN on a tract of land that was originally within the exterior borders of the
reservation described in the 1866 treaty between the MCN and the United States
government.
109
The state of Oklahoma prosecuted the case, and Murphy was
convicted and sentenced to death.
110
Several years later, Murphy filed a habeas
petition in federal court, arguing, among other things, that since his crime
occurred on an Indian reservation—a quintessential type of “Indian country”—
the state’s prosecution was unlawful.
It’s important to understand that, with some significant exceptions, the
federal government and tribal government, and not the state government, share
concurrent jurisdiction over a murder committed by an Indian on an Indian
reservation.
111
Murphy argued that he had been tried and convicted in the wrong
court—that since his crime occurred on an Indian reservation, the federal
government should have prosecuted him. The state’s main response was that the
reservation no longer existed, and thus state jurisdiction was lawful. Not
surprisingly, the merits briefs (and most of the amicus briefs) focused on the
federal precedent, the long, sordid history of Oklahoma statehood, and the
callous but failed efforts to extinguish the MCN altogether. Although the legal
question before the court is relatively simple (“Does the reservation still exist?”),
the legal arguments required extensive historical research to uncover Congress’s
intended boundaries of the reservation. Although it is not a party to the case, the
decision will obviously have great ramifications for the MCN. Once the case
107. Murphy v. Royal, 875 F.3d 896 (10th Cir. 2017), cert. granted, 138 S. Ct. 2026 (2018).
108. Brief of Amici Curiae National Indigenous Women’s Resource Center and Additional
Advocacy Organizations for Survivors of Domestic Violence and Assault in Support of Respondent,
Carpenter v. Murphy (2018) (No. 17-1107) [hereinafter NIWRC Brief, Carpenter v. Murphy].
109. Murphy v. Royal, 875 F.3d 896, 904-905 (10th Cir. 2017) (“Mr. Murphy and the State agree
that the offense in this case occurred within the Creek Reservation if Congress has not disestablished it.”).
110. Id.
111. Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153.
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reached the circuit level, the MCN was granted leave to participate in oral
argument as amicus curiae.
The NIWRC brief, unlike the others, brought the interests of Native women
to the discussion.
112
We argued that the existing definition of “Indian Country”
should not be changed, because it is important that tribal governments exercise
expansive territorial jurisdiction to protect women and children from violence.
As part of this argument, we noted that in passing VAWA 2013 (explained infra
at Section I.B), Congress had recently restored tribal criminal jurisdiction over
non-Indians who are charged with certain domestic violence crimes. We argued
that when Congress passed that law, it clearly demarcated that this jurisdiction
would apply to “Indian country” and that Congress could not have anticipated
that the Supreme Court would suddenly change the rules for what constituted
“Indian country.”
113
We supported the arguments raised by Murphy and other
amici that reservation disestablishment could only be achieved through clear
congressional intent, which had not happened in this case.
The outcome in theMurphy case matters to Native women. If the Court rules
that the MCN reservation is still recognized by the United States, it will reaffirm
that MCN has the power to police and prosecute crimes committed anywhere
within the reservation, providing more safety and security to Native women who
rely on their tribal government to respond to domestic violence and sexual
assault. By bringing these concerns to the discussion, we hope that the Justices
will be sympathetic to arguments from tribal nations that can maximize their
potential to protect tribal citizens from harm. UnlikeDollar General and Bryant,
however, the initial oral arguments did not reveal any particular interest in how
victims might experience the ramifications of the decision. There is also the
possibility of another tie, as Justice Gorsuch has recused himself from the
consideration of the case.
114
It is premature to claim that briefs informed by IFLT will have a significant
impact on the Court, but this certainly is not a reason to abandon the efforts.
ProfessorMatthew L.M. Fletcher analyzed the efficacy of amicus briefs in Indian
law cases in a 2012 article, concluding that “the best amicus briefs in Indian law
cases offer some specialized and useful bits of information to the Supreme Court,
information not otherwise available.”
115
The key is finding the synergy between
the interests of Native women and the interests of tribal governments. The
NIWRC briefs also achieve some of the goals of IFLT by linking the rights of
tribal nations to the empowerment of Native women. As similar arguments are
offered in future cases (both in the Courts of Appeal and the Supreme Court), we
112. NIWRC Brief, Carpenter v. Murphy, supra note 108.
113. Id. at 23.
114. Justice Gorsuch was serving as a judge on the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals and took part in
the en banc consideration for a re-hearing in the case.
115. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Utility of Amicus Briefs in the Supreme Court’s Indian Cases, 2
AM. INDIAN L.J. 38, 51 (2013).
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may begin to develop future strategies about how to convey support for tribal
sovereignty through a gendered lens.
B. Federal Statutory Reform
Besides litigation in federal courts, many attorneys work on federal law
reform on behalf of tribal nations or tribal interests, and arguments informed by
IFLT can be informative here as well. From 1900 to 2015, tribal interests lost
76.5 percent of the time at the Supreme Court.
116
Some argue that efforts to
protect tribal interests might be better served by focusing on Congress as
opposed to the courts.
117
Certainly since Native women began working on the Violence Against
Women Act, originally passed in 1994, there has been an infusion of Native
women’s voices into Federal Indian legislation, culminating with the passage of
the Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010 (TLOA)
118
and the 2013 reauthorization
of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA 2013),
119
both of which restored
crucial aspects of tribal sovereignty.
TLOA and VAWA 2013 were omnibus bills containing a wealth of
directives and funding sources to deal with crime in Indian country. They made
two significant changes to tribal criminal jurisdiction. In TLOA, the ICRA was
revised to allow tribal nations that meet certain benchmarks to sentence offenders
to up to three years per offense rather than the previous one-year maximum. In
VAWA 2013, Congress restored tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians,
but only for the crimes of domestic violence, dating violence, or criminal
violation of a protection order, and only if the tribal nation has complied with
various federal requirements.
120
While the achievements may seem modest,
neither federal law would exist without the activism of Native women, including
attorneys, who articulated the need for these restorations of tribal authority.
We can expect to see continued momentum on Congressional actions to
address violence against Native women, particularly because of heightened
visibility of the “Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women” movements that
are emerging across the United States. The first two Native women in Congress
are also speaking out and sponsoring legislation intended to address the crisis of
116. Berger, supra note 104, at 1907.
117. Kirsten Matoy Carlson, Congress and Indians, 86 COLO. L. REV. 77, 81 (2015) (“[M]any
scholars, tribal leaders, and advocates have recently suggested that Congress may be more responsive than
the courts to Indian interests and have turned to legislative strategies for pursuing and protecting tribal
interests, especially tribal self-determination and jurisdiction.”).
118. Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, 124 Stat. 2258 (2010).
119. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, 127 Stat. 54
(2013).
120. 25 U.S.C. § 1304.
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violence against Native women.
121
I am cautiously optimistic that continued
engagement with law reform, informed by IFLT, will continue to yield positive
results.
122
In additional to pursuing new legislation like TLOA and VAWA, advocates
should also work toward the enforcement of existing Federal Indian law. In truth,
much of the substance of TLOA and VAWA are directives to federal agencies
to improve the way they implement existing laws and develop policy. For
example, TLOA requires the Department of Justice to release a yearly report that
summarizes federal prosecution activities in Indian country.
123
Indian law
practitioners, along with tribal leaders, must be vigilant to ensure that the
provisions are being implemented in ways that improve Native lives. Federal
legal reform in Congress is not guaranteed to achieve change on the ground
without sustained oversight. For example, a 2017 Office of the Inspector General
report concluded that significant goals of TLOA had not been achieved even
though the Obama administration had claimed that the law was a success.
124
It is
not enough to pass a law—we must ensure its enforcement.
C. Future Areas for Reform
Thus far, the efforts to bring gender-consciousness to Federal Indian law
have focused on criminal justice reform. But there are other gendered issues that
deserve renewed attention, including reproductive justice and environmental
law. I offer a few thoughts on how IFLT might inform efforts in these arenas.
Here, I focus on reproductive justice and environmental justice, though these are
only two examples of areas where IFLT could be informative.
Native women have struggled mightily for reproductive justice over the
course of the twentieth century. Allegations that the federal government, via the
Indian Health Service (IHS), forcibly sterilized Native women or sterilized them
without informed consent have been widely documented, with a focus on mid-
121. See, e.g., The Not Invisible Act of 2019, H.R. 2438; Violence Against Women
Reauthorization Act (VAWA) of 2019, H.R. 1585; SURVIVE Act of 2019, H.R. 1351; Studying the
Missing and Murdered Indian Crisis Act of 2019, H.R. 2029; The Native Youth and Tribal Officer
Protection Act of 2019, H.R. 958.
122. Again, it is important to acknowledge that there is not clear consensus even among Native
feminists as to the best way to resolve gender-based violence committed against Native women. Some
have raised valid concerns that laws like VAWA and TLOA promote the further assimilation of tribal
courts by requiring them to comply with new federal standards, and that the “law and order” model may
not be the best way to achieve justice for Native victims of gender-based violence. See, e.g., Kimberly
Robertson, The “Law and Order” of Violence Against Native Women: A Native Feminist Analysis of the
Tribal Law and Order Act, 5 DECOLONIZATION: INDIGENEITY, EDUC. & SOC’Y 1 (2016).
123. Section 211, Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, 124 Stat. 2258 (2010).
124. OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., REVIEW OF THE DEPARTMENT’S TRIBAL LAW ENFORCEMENT
EFFORTS PURSUANT TO THE TRIBAL LAW AND ORDER ACT OF 2010, at i (2017),
https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2017/e1801.pdf [https://perma.cc/2VH5-WSC3].
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to-late twentieth century practices.
125
There has been no true reckoning or
accountability for this history. Native women have also been targets of
aggressive birth control policies, including the use of Depo-Provera and
Norplant, long-acting contraceptives that can pose dangers to many women.
126
Indeed, it seems that the unofficial policy of the federal government has been to
stop Native women from reproducing. As noted in the early passages of this
Article, Native women today experience significantly higher rates of pre-term
births and infant mortality, and are less likely to access pre-natal care during
pregnancy.
127
Changes to federal laws and policies could be informed by IFLT,
and perhaps there will be a need for litigation at some point to ensure that Native
women have access to the resources necessary to bring healthy lives into the
world.
The inverse of this battle is more controversial—namely, that Native women
lack access to abortion services when they need to terminate pregnancies, due to
the prohibition on using federal dollars to fund abortion services.
128
To be sure,
abortion is as contentious within Native communities as it is within the rest of
the United States, particularly given the fraught history of sterilization abuse and
widespread child removal that has taken place in our communities.
129
Nonetheless, as a Native feminist who supports the right to abortion, I believe
we must do more to support the full range of reproductive choices and options
to Native women. IHS, as a federally funded agency, cannot provide abortion
services for Native women (with limited exceptions for life of the woman, rape,
and incest) because the so-called “Hyde Amendment” prohibits the use of federal
funding for abortion services. The Hyde Amendment was first passed in 1976,
and was upheld in Harris v. McRae in 1980.
130
However, no arguments were
proffered in McRae for Native women.
131
Moreover, there is no comprehensive
contemporary movement to repeal the Hyde Amendment in the Native legal
community, despite evidence that Hyde Amendment, by prohibiting abortion,
puts Native women’s lives and bodies at risk. The Native American Women’s
Health Education and Resource Center (NAWHERC), a Native owned-and-
125. See, e.g., Brint Dillingham, Indian Women and IHS Sterilization Practices, 3 AM. INDIAN J.
27 (1977); Jane Lawrence, The Indian Health Service and the Sterilization of Native American Women,
24 AM. INDIANQ. 400 (2000); Linda Robyn, Sterilization of American Indian Women Revisited: Another
Attempt to Solve the “Indian Problem,” in CRIME AND SOCIAL JUSTICE IN INDIAN COUNTRY 39-53
(Marianne O. Nielsen & Karen Jarratt-Snider eds., 2018).
126. JAEL SILLIMAN ET AL., UNDIVIDED RIGHTS: WOMEN OF COLOR ORGANIZE FOR
REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE 119 (2004).
127. See supra notes 13-18 and accompanying text.
128. This law is known as the “Hyde Amendment.” Pub. L. 96-123, § 109, 93 Stat. 926.
129. See, e.g., Carly Thomsen, From Refusing Stigmatization toward Celebration: New Directions
for Reproductive Justice Activism, 39 FEM. STUD. 149, 151-53 (2013) (chronicling the story of Cecilia
Fire Thunder, the first contemporary female president of the Oglala Lakota Nation, who was impeached
because of her support for abortion rights).
130. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
131. A word search of the amicus briefs and the transcript of oral arguments yielded no mention
of Native women, tribal governments, or Indian Health Service.
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operated non-profit organization near the Yankton Sioux Indian Reservation in
South Dakota has been one of the only Native women’s entities to address
reproductive justice in a sustained fashion.
132
They have raised national concerns
about the lack of access to sexual assault forensic exams and Plan B within the
Indian Health Service systems. They remain one of the only Native organizations
that regularly call for a repeal of the Hyde Amendment. The mainstream efforts
to repeal the Hyde Amendment are spearheaded by a nonprofit organization
called All Above All, and there are several mentions of Native women in the
materials on their webpage.
133
IFLT is also a useful framework for thinking about environmental law.
Gender intersects with issues of environmental protection in several ways.
Native women have unique vested interests in tribal environmental law and have
been at the forefront of major activism efforts such as the Idle No More
movement in Canada and the NoDAPL efforts at Standing Rock.
134
There is a
gendered nature to environmental degradation for many tribal cultures, which
perceive the earth as feminine.
135
In a practical sense, the oil extraction projects
of major corporations have wrought unique health issues for Native women who
have discovered, for example, toxins in their breast milk.
136
In addition,
extractive projects such as fracking have wreaked havoc on the safety of Native
women and children through the creation of “man camps”—temporary housing
encampments for non-Native pipeline workers that are set up in or adjacent to
tribal lands.
137
These “man camps” have resulted in untold tragedy in many tribal
132. Reproductive Justice Program, NATIVE AM. WOMEN’S HEALTH EDUC. RESOURCE CTR.,
http://www.nativeshop.org/programs/reproductive-justice.html [https://perma.cc/P9AF-SPJM].
133. Search Results for “Native”, ALL ABOVE ALL, https://allaboveall.org/?s=Native
[https://perma.cc/NLD9-FH4T] (showing that a search for “Native” on the website yielded over a dozen
hits).
134. See, e.g., Kim TallBear, Badass (Indigenous) Women Caretake Relations: #NoDAPL,
#IdleNoMore, #BlackLivesMatter, Cultural Anthropology, SOC’Y FOR CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY
(2016), https://culanth.org/fieldsights/badass-indigenous-women-caretake-relations-no-dapl-idle-no-mo
re-black-lives-matter [https://perma.cc/7KWW-LDY4] (“Women of the Oceti Sakowin, or the Seven
Council Fires, are at the center of the movement at Standing Rock, widely dubbed #NoDAPL.”); Meredith
Privott, An Ethos of Responsibility and Indigenous Women Water Protectors in the #NoDAPLMovement,
43 AM. INDIANQ. 74, 76 (2019) (“[T]he voices of Indigenous women water protectors (of Standing Rock
and beyond) figure prominently, as women water protectors undeniably played a central role in shaping
and forwarding this movement.”).
135. Sarah Deer & Elizabeth Ann Kronk Warner, Raping Indian Country, 38 COLUM. J. GEND. &
L. (forthcoming 2019) (“Because many tribal cultures ascribe important feminine qualities to the land, the
mistreatment of “mother earth” carries important gendered consequences.”).
136. See, e.g., Bruce E. Johansen, The Inuit’s Struggle with Dioxins and Other Organic Pollutants,
26 AM. INDIAN Q. 479, 479 (2002) (“Thus the Arctic, which seems so clean on the surface, has become
one of the most contaminated places on Earth—a place where Inuit mothers think twice before breast-
feeding their babies because high levels of dioxins and other industrial chemicals are being detected in
their breast milk”); Janice Wormworth, Toxins and Tradition: The Impact of Food-Chain Contamination
on the Inuit of Northern Quebec, 152 CAN. MED. ASSOC. J. 1237, 1237 (1995) (“The levels of
polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) he found [in Indigenous mothers’ breast milk] were five times greater
than those among Caucasian women living in southern Quebec.”).
137. See, e.g., Kathleen Finn et al., Responsible Resource Development and Prevention of Sex
Trafficking: Safeguarding Native Women and Children on the Fort Berthold Reservation, 40 HARV. J.L.
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communities because of the high rates of sexual violence and sex trafficking that
accompany them.
138
Thus far, an opportunity has not presented itself for bringing a gender-
conscious argument to bear in the environmental context, but that most certainly
will change in the coming years as more becomes known as to how environment
degradation has unique gendered outcomes.
II. TRIBAL LAW
In this section, I analyze an IFLT approach to tribal law (as opposed to
Federal Indian law). To determine how to bring feminism into conversation with
tribal-centric law, we must consider how contemporary Native nations are
situated with regard to gender and sexuality, a nearly impossible task when
considering the diversity of tribal cultures. While many tribal nations emanate
from cultures that are matrilineal and matrilocal, it is clear that some tribal
nations operate with patriarchal principles that are products of long-term
assimilation with American systems, as discussed earlier in this Article. We
cannot assume that tribal justice systems have adequately addressed colonial
patriarchy.
Historically, tribal nations that wished to operate legal systems that would
be recognized by the federal government were nearly always encouraged to build
a tribal court based on Western legal principles, to the detriment of traditional
tribal dispute processes.
139
As some tribal legal systems became assimilated, they
adopted the trappings of Western law and order, a system that is grounded in
gender hierarchy.
140
Thus, attorneys who practice within the confines of tribal
law also must be thoughtful about the extent to which assimilated court systems
have ignored gender as a central component of analysis. Because most tribal
legal systems have been heavily influenced by American culture, we see the
same challenges with assumptions about gender-neutral laws. Assimilated legal
systems adopted much of the framework and philosophy of the American
systems of governance, including exact language in many cases.
141
And, of
&GENDER 1, 2 (2017) (“[T]he influx of well-paid male oil and gas workers, living in temporary housing
often referred to as “man camps,” has coincided with a disturbing increase in sex trafficking of Native
women.”).
138. Id. at 2-3.
139. Kiowa legal scholar Kirke Kickingbird remarks that “European colonists . . . were unwilling
or unable to leave the Indian systems of justice intact. The result was a continuing erosion of Indian control
over their own institutions.” Kirke Kickingbird, In Our Image…After Our Likeness: The Drive for
Assimilation of Indian Court Systems, 13 AM. CRIM. LAW REV. 675, 680 (1976).
140. FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note 68, at 4 (“[W]hat passes for neutral law making and
objective legal reasoning is often bound up in traditional assumptions and power hierarchies.”).
141. Many contemporary tribal courts are outgrowths of the first courts established on reservations
by the Bureau of Indian Affairs during the late nineteenth century—courts that were designed to assimilate
Native people into a western, Anglo-American legal system. See Julia M Bedell, The Fairness of Tribal
Court Juries and Non-Indian Defendants, 41 AM. INDIAN LAW REV. 253, 257-258 (2017).
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course, the early American legal system is hardly the starting point for a
government interested in gender equity in society. In that sense, re-infusing
gender and sexuality into our tribal legal systems moves us closer to a
decolonizing approach to tribal legal matters.
In this Part, I argue that issues of gender and sexuality can and should be
considered in the context of tribal court litigation and tribal statutory
development. Ann Tweedy’s excellent 2010 article, Sex Discrimination Under
Tribal Law, takes a comprehensive look at sex discrimination prohibitions in
tribal constitutions, statutes, cases, and policies.
142
It is important to note that the
Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA) currently allows tribal governments and courts
to make gender differentiations under certain circumstances. ICRA imposes
certain language from the federal constitution onto tribal governments, including
the following passage, which mirrors language from the Fourteenth Amendment:
“[No Indian tribe shall] deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of its laws or deprive any person of liberty or property without due
process of law.”
143
Under most readings of Federal Indian law, tribal courts are
free to interpret that equal protection and due process language in ways that may
differ from the interpretation of the federal Constitution by the federal judiciary.
Still, many tribal courts do not deviate significantly from federal constitutional
law in interpreting ICRA language.
In federal courts, of course, the equal protection provision of the Fourteenth
Amendment was not applied to gender discrimination until the late twentieth
century, and gender discrimination has never seen more than “intermediate
scrutiny”—a concept that is not altogether clear given the few gender
discrimination cases that reach the highest Court. In United States v. Virginia,
perhaps the most “feminist” decision ever issued by the Supreme Court, Justice
Ginsburg stopped short of requiring “strict scrutiny” in gender distinction cases,
writing that gender classifications must be given “heightened scrutiny.”
144
Many tribal codes indicate that custom and tradition are viable laws,
145
yet
we do not often see much engagement with culture and tradition, at least in the
appellate courts of tribes that publish their opinions. There are vital lessons
embedded within many tribal legal concepts, and gender can play a role in many
different types of cases.
142. Tweedy, Sex Discrimination Under Tribal Law, supra note 60.
143. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(8) (emphasis added).
144. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 555 (1996).
145. Gloria Valencia-Weber, Tribal Courts: Custom and Innovative Law, 24 N.M. L. REV. 225,
248 (1994).
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A. Gender in Tribal Court Litigation
For the past several years, I have collected an assortment of tribal court
opinions that engage with gender as a legal category. Because most tribal
appellate cases are not readily accessible,
146
these cases are not necessarily
representative of how all tribal courts consider gender. I am currently working
with an inventory of approximately twenty tribal court cases that engage with
gender in a meaningful way, including in dicta, in an effort to widen the scope.
I gathered this corpus of decisions by performing keyword searches in various
tribal court databases, including gendered words such as “woman” and
“matrilineal” and selecting cases where tribal judges and justices had to consider
the role of gender in their analyses.
This collection includes both district level opinions as well as appellate level
opinions. Almost all of the decisions are cases of first impression, meaning that
there is not a corpus of cases where the tribal court had already considered
gendered issues in this context. I describe some of these decisions below, not to
explicate any particular patterns but rather as a sample of different ways in which
tribal law and gender intersect. It should also be noted that these cases are not
binding authority on the development of laws for other tribal nations (although
they could be cited to as persuasive authority for other tribal courts, if relevant).
1. Hepler v. Perkins
Hepler v. Perkins
147
is a relatively early case that arose out of southeastern
Alaska. In resolving a custody dispute between a non-Indian father and a Tlingit
mother, the tribal court referred a question of customary law to a Court of Elders,
who returned this statement on matrilineal clanmembership. “Children of female
members of a clan are children of the clan regardless of where or under what
circumstances they may be found. Clan membership does not wash off, nor can
such membership be removed by any force, or any distance, or over time. Clan
membership continues even in death, and in re-birth it is renewed.”
148
By codifying this statement into case law, matrilineal clanship is seen as the
traditional principle that informed the tribal court’s decision that the Sitka Tribe
has jurisdiction over the children of female family members regardless of where
they reside.
146. See Bonnie Shucha,Whatever Tribal Precedent There May Be: The (Un)Availablity of Tribal
Law, 106 LAW. LIBR. J. 199, 199 (2014) (“For a majority of the 566 federally recognized tribes in the
United States today, no law has been published.”).
147. 13 Indian L. Rep. 6011 (Sitka Cmty. Ass’n Tr. Ct., Apr. 7, 1986).
148. Id. at 6016.
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2. Naize v. Naize
The Navajo Nation Supreme Court is perhaps the most well-known tribal
court for drawing upon customary principles in deciding contemporary legal
cases.
149
Here, I explore two cases that concern gender roles. The first, Naize v.
Naize,
150
is a 1997 divorce case. The appeal considered spousal maintenance
ordered by the trial court. The former husband had been ordered to pay his very
ill former spouse $200 per month for three years.
151
The tribal court had also
ordered him to provide a truckload of wood and coal during the winter months
for an indefinite period.
152
While there was no spousal maintenance explicitly called for in the Navajo
statutory code, the Court determined that Navajo courts can look to “traditional
Navajo teachings” that one should not “throw their family away” to justify the
order of spousal maintenance. The Court reasoned that
traditional Navajo society is matrilineal and matrilocal, which obligates
a man upon marriage to move to his wife’s residence. The property the
couple bring to the marriage mingle and through their joint labors create
a stable and permanent home for themselves and their children. The
wife’s immediate and extended family benefit directly and indirectly, in
numerous ways, from the marriage. If the marriage does not survive,
customary law directs the man to leave with his personal possessions
(including his horse and riding gear, clothes, and religious items) and
the rest of the marital property stays with the wife and children at their
residence for their support and maintenance.
153
With this understanding, the Court upheld the award of monetary payments after
analyzing the significant hardships faced by the wife.
154
Interestingly, the Court
went on to strike down the order of indefinite supply of winter wood and coal,
stating that another tradition of Navajo people is that there must be finality in
divorce cases so that harmony can be restored.
155
3. Riggs v. Attakai
In Riggs v. Estate of Attakai,
156
the Navajo Court was called upon to
determine the appropriate party to hold a leasing permit for sheep grazing, and it
149. See generally RAYMOND D. AUSTIN, NAVAJO COURTS AND NAVAJOCOMMON LAW (2009).
150. 1 Am. Tribal Law 445 (1997).
151. Id. at 447.
152. Id. at 447.
153. Id. at 449.
154. Id. at 449-50.
155. Id. at 450.
156. 7 Am. Tribal Law 534, No. SC-CV-39-04, 2007 WL 5886339 (Navajo June 13, 2007).
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ultimately codified matrilineal land tenure in its decision.
157
After exploring a
gender-neutral five-factor test for awarding grazing permits that was established
by a 1991 Navajo case, the Riggs Court held that the five-factor test should be
applied
consistent with the Navajo Fundamental Law which defines the role and
authority of Diné women in our society. Traditionally, women are
central to the home and land base. They are the vein of the clan line. The
clan line typically maintains a land base upon which the clan lives, uses
the land for grazing and agricultural purposes and maintains the land for
medicinal and ceremonial purposes.
158
Again, it should be noted that this a case of a Navajo court interpreting
Navajo law, and perhaps another tribal court would analyze the question
differently in light of different tribal traditional practice. But we should also
notice what the Court is doing here—it is pushing back against the patriarchal
history of westernized jurisprudence by clearly laying out the importance of
Navajo women to tribal culture. This doctrine may become relevant in a future
case that considers protections for Native women and girls.
4. The Bigfire Cases
The Supreme Court of the Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska consolidated a
series of criminal cases implicating gender and equal protection in 1998.
159
The
Winnebago Tribe prosecuted three male teenagers under a gender-neutral
statutory rape tribal statute provision that stated that “any person who subjects
an unemancipated minor to sexual penetration is guilty of sexual assault in the
second degree.” Two of the males were 17 and their female victims were 12. In
the third case, the male was 15 and the female victim was 13. The defendants
alleged that the victims consented to the sexual penetration and raised equal
protection arguments because the underage females were not prosecuted.
160
The
defendants relied on federal case law to support their position.
The legal question presented by these cases was whether it is impermissible
to prosecute only boys and not girls under the sexual assault statute. The
Winnebago court engaged with custom and tradition to side with the prosecution.
The Court begins by referencing the work of an ethnologist who published the
following tribal teaching in 1923, which says:
157. Id. at 536. (“Navajos maintain and carry on the custom that the maternal clan maintains
traditional grazing and farming areas.”).
158. Id. at 536.
159. Winnebago Tribe of Neb. v. Hugh Bigfire, 25 Indian L. Rep. 6229, 6229 (Winn. Sup. Ct.
1998).
160. Id. at 6230.
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My son, never abuse your wife. The women are sacred. If you abuse
your wife and make her life miserable, you will die early. Our
grandmother, the earth, is a woman, and in mistreating your wife you
will be mistreating her. Most assuredly will you be abusing our
grandmother if you act thus. And as it is she that is taking care of us you
will really be killing yourself by such behavior.
161
The Court then explains how this traditional teaching can inform the legal
analysis, noting that:
This quotation nicely summarizes Ho-Chunk thinking on gender
relationships. Gender differences constitute a natural part of life. Indeed,
the Earth, the Grandmother who gives life, is female. Thus, gender role
differentiation and gender differences in legal or customary treatment
related to those roles are natural and expected. In Ho-Chunk culture,
therefore, gender differences or disparities in treatment do not signal
hierarchy, lack of respect or invidious discrimination, but, rather, are a
respected and natural part of life. They are, indeed, part of the way that
the Winnebago world view brings meaning to life.
162
In considering these traditional tenets about gender in the Ho-Chunk culture,
the Court applies strict scrutiny to gender discrimination and ultimately
concludes that the Tribe had a compelling interest for gender discrimination in
this case.
5. Casteel v. Cherokee Nation
Not all tribal court engagement with gendered questions is necessarily
positive. Casteel v. Cherokee Nation
163
is the only tribal appellate case I have
discovered where there is clear indication that a litigant made an intentional and
direct feminist argument to a tribal judiciary. It was rejected soundly. The case
itself involved the termination of an employee for sexual harassment. The
Cherokee Judicial Appeals Tribunal
164
determined that the Tribe failed to meet
its burden of proof—that is, they did not establish a pattern of behavior necessary
to terminate the employment.
However, it is apparent that the attorney for the Cherokee Nation (a woman)
objected to the fact that the judicial panel was comprised of three men, a notion
that was soundly rejected by the Tribunal, which stated:
161. Id. at 6232 (citing PAULRADIN, THEWINNEBAGO TRIBE 122 (1923)).
162. Bigfire, 25 Indian L. Rep. at 6232.
163. Casteel v. Cherokee Nation, 5 Okla. Trib. 147 (1996).
164. Today, this is known as the Cherokee Supreme Court.
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We further reject the statement made by . . . counsel for the Cherokee
Nation . . . that this Court, being composed of three male judges, is
incapable of applying the reasonable person standard in this case. Bias,
no matter how well meaning, has no place in the courtroom. [The
attorney] is hereby admonished to be more respectful when addressing
this Court in the future.
165
Although I do not have access to the transcript of the oral arguments and
thus cannot assess exactly what the attorney argued, it is clear that this particular
tribal court was opposed to considering how the gender makeup of the court
might influence its decision. This case serves as a reminder that arguments
informed by IFLT may not be successful in tribal court, and as a reminder that
we must not romanticize the idea of bringing gendered issues to tribal court.
B. Tribal Statutory Development
In this Section, I consider several ways that IFLT can inform the
development of contemporary gender-conscious tribal statutory law. This
Section of the Article is perhaps the most daunting, because as an advocate for
tribal political and legal independence, I do not seek to tell tribal nations how to
govern themselves. Instead, I am interested in encouraging tribal leaders to
consult with the women and Two-Spirit people of their nations before passing
laws that may affect or endanger them.
I encourage tribal attorneys and legislators to consult with local women
before passing laws that criminalize their behavior. For example, some tribal
nations have passed laws which allow tribal prosecutors to file criminal child
abuse or neglect charges against pregnant women who use drugs or alcohol
during pregnancy.
166
There is ample room for debate on the efficacy of this
policy, and certainly sound minds can disagree, but my concern is whether the
women of those particular communities have had a chance to weigh in on
something as significant as criminalizing behavior during pregnancy. If possible,
tribal legislatures and tribal litigants should consult female elders and leaders in
the community about the best way to respond to the crisis of infants born with
drugs in their system or other related concerns. Ideally, these female elders
would be able to offer insight as to how traditional principles and tenets inform
contemporary practices. Perhaps tribal nations could consider developing local
165. 5 Okla. Trib. at 3.
166. See, e.g., Standing Rock Sioux Tribal Code of Justice Sec. 4-1204 (Child Neglect); White
Mountain Apache Criminal Code, Sec. 2.82 (Endangering an Unborn Child); Reno-Sparks Indian
Community Law and Order Code, Sec. 4-5-310 (Fetal Endangerment); Shoalwater Bay Tribe Code of
Laws, Sec. 2.02.09 (Endangering a Fetus).
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women’s task forces, which would be able to assess the needs of women in the
community so that the tribal nation’s legislature can be better informed.
Gendered issues arise in a variety of different ways in tribal codes. Tribal
nations could have the best laws in the world when it comes to addressing
sexism. Tribal governments may wish to revisit their laws on divorce, custody,
extended family, sexual violence, juvenile justice—all places where Native
conceptions of gender might be relevant. Tribal nations can ensure, through
statutory reform, that women and LGBTQ+ employees have expansive remedies
for discriminatory treatment. Tribal governments might consider developing
stricter laws and policies on sex trafficking, the establishment of “man camps,”
and other efforts to enhance the safety of the communities. Even in those cases
where the tribal nation is not allowed to prosecute non-Indians, tribal
governments could amplify civil remedies for victims, including expansive
protection orders and civil tort remedies. Tribal governments could set training
requirements for first responders and other tribal officials that may come into
contact with victims of gender-based violence. They may also strengthen
employment protections for victims of violence who might miss work due to the
physical, psychological, and legal barriers. There is no limit to the way that
sovereign nations can imagine and explicate a system that seeks to end gendered
oppression.
III. GENDER EQUITY IN LEGAL EDUCATION&PRACTICE
If IFLT is to have “legs” and begin to be used as a tool in both Federal Indian
law and tribal law, we need to cultivate a new generation of attorneys, scholars,
and activists who can begin the development of a unique approach to
jurisprudence when it comes to tribal governments. Unfortunately, Native
women have been absent from the legal academy and nearly absent from legal
scholarship in the United States. The earliest law review article about Native
women I have found in my research was published in the American Indian Law
Review in 1975.
167
The first law review article about violence against Native
women was not published until 1993.
168
Even in 2019, there are still only a
handful of law review articles that focus on Native women. Whereas there has
been an explosion of Native feminist interventions in other scholarly disciplines
such as history, sociology and indigenous studies,
169
there is very little Native
feminist intervention in the law.
167. Bysiewicz & Van De Mark, The Legal Status of the Dakota Indian Woman, supra note 45.
168. James W. Zion & Elsie B. Zion, Hozho’ Sokee’ – Stay Together Nicely: Domestic Violence
Under Navajo Common Law, 25 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 407 (1993).
169. Several interdisciplinary anthologies about Native feminisms have been published in the last
10 years. See, e.g., INDIGENOUS WOMEN AND FEMINISM, supra note 29; CRITICALLY SOVEREIGN, supra
note 29.
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To cultivate future feminist interventions in Indian law, I contend that we
must do more to recruit and support Native women law students, and, ultimately,
more Native women law professors. While Native men can certainly advance the
cause of Native women, it is important that feminist interventions are backed by
Native women attorneys who feel confident about advancing legal arguments on
behalf of other Native women. There are very few Native women lawyers in the
United States, and only a handful of Native women teaching in law schools.
170
This must change if we are to see significant shifts in the way that Native women
can inform and influence the practice of Indian law in the United States. I believe
that IFLT should begin to be taught in the law school curriculum, including in
Indian law, feminist jurisprudence, and critical legal studies.
Unfortunately, Native women attorneys also experience racism and sexism
in the legal workplace—both in the private and public sectors. For the past 20
years, I have heard anecdotal stories from other Native women attorneys about
discrimination and abuse in the workplace. But there was no way of estimating
the prevalence of discrimination because, until 2015, there was no
comprehensive study of Native attorneys in the United States that asked such
questions. The National Native American Bar Association (NNABA)
commissioned such a study and published the results in 2015.
171
Over 500
attorneys responded to the study, and the results were illuminating. The study
reveals that Native women attorneys suffer an unacceptable rate of gender-
related discrimination in the profession. For example, nearly 38 percent of Native
women respondents said they have experienced demeaning comments or
harassment based on gender in the workplace.
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Thirty-five percent reported that
they had been discriminated based on gender
173
and nearly thirty percent reported
that they had been denied appropriate compensation due to gender.
174
Of those
Nativewomenwho had left the legal profession, 33 percent did so in part because
of gender bias.
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The study also revealed that Native women were mistreated by
Native men in the legal workplace, revealing that the problem goes beyond non-
Indian discrimination.
176
Native women working for the federal government have also suffered from
discrimination. A 2017 survey of Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) employees
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showed 40 percent had experienced some form of harassment—primarily racial
and sexual—in their workplaces in the past 12 months.
177
In fact, BIA suffers
from the highest rate of harassment within the Department of Interior.
178
The
perpetrators were typically older males.
179
In the past two years, several prominent officials within the BIA have been
investigated for sexual harassment. One BIA supervisor in the Southwest
regional office repeatedly sexually harassed women—one subordinate said that
he “pulled down the front of her shirt to ask if she was wearing a bra” and another
subordinate reported that he “put his hand up her skirt.”
180
Managers were
informed about his behavior but did not act immediately.
181
In April 2018, BIA
Director Bryan Rice resigned abruptly after reports surfaced that he had harassed
and bullied women subordinates.
182
The problems with sexist culture in the
federal government are not limited to the BIA. During theObama administration,
William Mendoza, who was the director of the White House Initiative on
American Indian and Alaska Native Education, resigned after pleading guilty to
attempted voyeurism after video footage showed him taking “up skirt” photos
on the Washington, D.C. Metro.
183
A series of recent investigative reports on sexual harassment in the lives of
Native women uncovered a plethora of stories about the behavior of Native men
in high profile positions.
184
While not specific to the attorney experience, these
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stories indicate that many Native women experience unacceptable rates of
harassment in the workplace, often perpetrated by powerful and respected men
in their communities. These survivors of harassment interviewed for the series
of articles “shared an overwhelming fear about losing their jobs, the chances for
future employment, housing, social services for themselves and their families as
well as the love, respect and support from close knit Native communities.”
185
These levels of sexism, harassment, and assault cannot continue to be part
of the lives of Native women attorneys and government workers. In the era of
the #MeToo movement, the Indian Bar must do better to address a culture of
toxic masculinity that seems to have permeated some of the most important
workplaces in Indian law today.
CONCLUSION
This Article has focused primarily on sex and sexism as a key intervention
in IFLT, but we also must remember that issues of sexuality and gender identity
are also impacted by legal hegemony and settler colonialism. Because these
issues deserve full attention, in future pieces, I will strive to consider how
homophobia and other forms of discrimination against Two-Spirit people can be
addressed through IFLT.
The safety and well-being of tribal nations depends on the safety and well-
being of Native women. Patriarchy and settler colonialism have taken their toll
on the lives of Native people and IFLT can offer new, innovative ways of
thinking about gender liberation in the context of tribal sovereignty. In theDollar
General brief, Mary Kathryn Nagle and I used the following traditional quotation
from the Cheyenne to open our argument. I use it now in closing.
“The Nation shall be strong so long as the hearts of the women are not on
the ground.”
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